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Abstract 
 
We construct a two-sector endogenous growth model to examine the role of 
government in industrialization. Three main features of this model are (a) 
household preference is non-homothetic; (b) government’s sector-specific 
spending is introduced as a production factor and (c) technological progress 
occurs only in the manufacturing sector through learning-by-doing. By using the 
model with these features, we derive the optimal policy for government resource 
allocation, optimal tax rate and share of government spending for each sector, to 
maximize the household’s utility. In addition, we examine the dynamics of the 
model. 
The model reveals that (a) increments in both agricultural productivity 
and manufacturing productivity cause labour to move from the agricultural sector 
to the manufacturing sector; (b) depending on the relative elasticity of production 
with respect to government’s spending between the two sectors, the optimal tax 
rate will shrink or expand with the passage of time and will stay at a  level of 
balanced growth path in the long run and (c) as the industrialization progresses, 
the optimal share of government spending for the agricultural sector will decline. 
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1.  Introduction 
Industrialization plays a key role in economic development and growth in many 
countries. In pursuing industrialization, governments in many developing countries 
have emphasized expansion of the manufacturing sector, often at the expense of the 
agricultural sector. However, in some countries, such as India, this policy has resulted 
in stagnant economic growth or in expansion of poverty in rural areas, where most 
people engage in agriculture. 
Several studies concerning the relation between industrialization and 
economic growth have appeared since the early 1950s. Lewis (1954), Fei and Ranis 
(1964) and Jorgenson (1961, 1967) are some early attempts on this subject. The 
model in these studies, known as the dual economy model, mainly argued that the 
continuous progress in agricultural productivity, not manufacturing productivity, is 
necessary to avoid food shortages and to achieve sustained growth.1 Thus, these 
studies emphasized that to improve agricultural productivity governments should 
prioritize their policies, such as land improvement or irrigation policies. Recently, 
Matsuyama (1992) and Eswaran and Kotwal (1993) shed new light on the relation 
between industrialization and each sector’s productivity, by using general equilibrium 
models that are more sophisticated than earlier dual economy models. Matsuyama 
(1992) showed that in a closed economy improvements in agricultural productivity, 
not in manufacturing productivity, lead to industrialization and economic 
development, yielding results similar to those of the earlier dual economy models. 
However, he showed that, in a small open economy improvements in manufacturing 
productivity promote technological progress in manufacturing sector and cause 
economic development.2 
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Although these studies explained which sector—agriculture or 
manufacturing—plays a key role in industrialization and economic development, they 
did not treat the government sector explicitly and did not mention the concrete role of 
government. How should government provide infrastructure to promote industries? 
To the best of the author’s knowledge, Ortiz (2004) and Chang, Chen and Hsu (2006) 
are the only attempts to address such questions. Ortiz (2004) derived optimal tax rate 
for industrialization by using a model that incorporated the productive government 
spending argued in Barro (1990) into the model of Matsuyama (1992). In his model, 
government spending takes the form of infrastructure development and is nonrival 
among sectors in the economy. It leaves no room to consider the case that government 
divides the productive government spending between any two sectors depending on 
their characteristics. However, actually some of the productive government spending, 
such as that on land reforming and industrial water service, are sector-specific, and we 
should regard such spending as sector-specific production factors. Chang, Chen and 
Hsu (2006) extended Matsuyama (1992) by introducing a government that supplies 
the manufacturing sector with infrastructure to promote learning-by-doing in that 
sector. While their model explicitly showed the role of government in manufacturing, 
they did not mention government’s role in the agricultural sector.  
On the basis of earlier studies, including those mentioned above, this study 
aims to examine the relationship among the role of government, industrialization and 
economic development. In particular, it considers government’s role in agriculture 
and manufacturing simultaneously and examines how government should adjust its 
policy weight between the two sectors along the path of economic growth. To achieve 
so, we incorporate sector-specific productive government spending into Matsuyama’s 
(1992) model and construct an endogenous growth model with the two sectors: 
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agriculture and manufacturing. The model has three notable features. First, both 
sectors employ two factors of production: labour and sector-specific government 
spending. Therefore, government’s budgetary decisions for each sector are an 
important component of the model. Second, following Matsuyama (1992), the growth 
engine for the economy is technological progress in manufacturing arising from 
learning-by-doing. On the other hand, there is no technological progress in 
agricultural sector. Finally, household preferences are non-homothetic, and income 
elasticity of demand for agricultural goods is less than 1, implying that Engel’s law 
holds.3 Non-homothetic preferences are regarded as a cause of industrialization in 
many studies on economic development. Under non-homothetic preference, rising per 
capita income results in a decline in budgetary share of the commodity with lower 
income elasticity of demand, such as agricultural goods, which in turn leads to 
industrialization. Echevarria (1997, 2000), Kongsamut et al. (2001) and Gollin et al. 
(2002) are representative studies investigating the implications of non-homothetic 
preference for industrialization. 
By using our model, we derive an optimal policy for allocation of government 
resources among sectors, an optimal tax rate and the dynamics of economic variables, 
such as GDP and the manufacturing sector’s share of the total labour endowment. Our 
analysis is restricted to a closed economy, while Matsuyama (1992) examined both 
closed and open economy cases. Because of our model’s complexity, the case of the 
open economy must be analysed separately from the present study. 
The paper is organized as follows: The next section, Section 2, specifies 
notations and assumptions and sets up the model. The features, existence and 
uniqueness of the static equilibrium are analysed in Section 3, together with some 
comparative statics analyses. In Section 4, we examine how government decides its 
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policy. Section 5 deals with dynamics of the model. The last section summarizes the 
main results and concludes. 
 
2.  The Model 
2-A.  The Production and the Factor Market 
The economy consists of two production sectors: agriculture ( ) and manufacturing 
(
A
M ). Agricultural goods are produced by competitive firms using two factor inputs: 
labour ( LA ) and productive government spending ( gA ). Here, gA  (and  to appear 
later) is non-rival among firms within the sector and is provided without charges. 
These features are the same as those defined by Barro (1990) and Barro and Sala-i-
Martin (1992, 1995), which show that productive government spending affects the 
long-run growth rate. But,  (
Mg
ig MAi ,= ) differs from Barro’s assumption in being a 
sector-specific factor, which we believe is more realistic than Barro’s assumption. 
Consider the typical examples of agricultural irrigation and industrial water service, 
both of which are public services but differ in function. Therefore, it is reasonable to 
assume that public services are sector-specific production factors. 
Technology is subject to diminishing returns with respect to each factor. We 
specify the agricultural production function as follows: 
α
A
a
AA gALY = , 10 << a , 10 << α  (1)  
 
where  implies total factor productivity in agriculture. Manufacturing goods are 
produced using efficient labour (
A
mLM ) and productive government spending ( gM ). 
Technology exhibits diminishing returns to each factor, the same as in the agriculture 
sector: 
( ) βMbMM gmLMY = , 10 << b , 10 << β  (2) 
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where M,  and denote total factor productivity in manufacturing, labour 
productivity and labour input in the manufacturing sector, respectively. 
m ML
α  and β  in 
equations (1) and (2) implies that the elasticities of output with respect to government 
spending on agriculture and manufacturing, respectively, and these are important in 
deciding patterns of transitional dynamics in our model. 
There is no factor accumulation. Instead, we assume that labour productivity 
in manufacturing improves alongside the process through which manufacturing 
production proceeds and we assume that its increment depends on production per 
labour, not on total production.4 This formalization is along the lines of the external 
learning-by-doing process à la Romer (1986). Thus, the increment in m is expressed 
by 
βδδ MbMb
M
M gLMm
L
Ym 1−==& , 10 << δ   (3) 
 
where δ  denotes the degree of learning-by-doing. 
Government levies sales tax on each sector as a constant rate of revenueτ , and 
labour is assumed to be fully mobile between sectors. These assumptions, along with 
those of perfect competition and profit maximization in each sector, imply that the 
wage rate ( ) in terms of agricultural goods is equal to w
( ) ( ) βα ττ MbMbAaA gLpbMmgaALw 11 11 −− −=−=  (4) 
 
where p denotes the relative price of manufacturing goods. 
2-B.  Behaviour of Representative Household 
We assume that all households are identical and have the following utility function 
( ) MA ccU lnln +−= γθ , given  ,θγ  (5) 
 
where  is consumption of commodity ic i ( )MAi ,= . This specification is the same as 
that in Matsuyama (1992) and is known as the Stone-Geary type utility function. It 
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has two specific properties: First, γ  implies the minimum quantity of consumption of 
agricultural goods required for survival. Second, income elasticity of demand for 
agricultural goods is less than 1. This second property, known as Engel’s law, causes 
industrialization through changes in household demand and is important in our model. 
From equation (5) and households’ utility maximization, consumer demand for the 
two goods (agricultural and manufacturing goods) satisfies 
γθ −= Acp Mc . (6) 
 
We also assume that the number of households is equal to the total labour 
endowment: . L
2-C.  The Government Sector 
Government collects sales taxes from firms in each sector and uses the revenue for 
productive government spending. In our model, government is assumed to obey the 
balanced-budget rule. The budget constraint for the government and the amount of 
spending for each sector are as follows: 
( ) ( )MA pYYg p , (7) 1= ⋅ ⋅τ +
gsAg A =    (8) 
 and     ( )gsg AM                (9) 1= −
 
where  and  denote the share of expenditures from total tax revenue for the 
agricultural sector and the manufacturing sector, respectively, and 
As ( As−1 )
10 << As
As
.5  is 
total government expenditure in terms of manufacturing goods. Here,  can be 
regarded as the policy weight between sectors: a large  implies that the government 
emphasizes agricultural development, whereas a small  implies that the 
government encourages manufacturing development.  
g
As
As
We also assume that government purchases products from the manufacturing 
sector and uses them in providing governmental services. 
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2-D.  Market Equilibrium 
To conclude the model, we specify equilibrium conditions in markets for production 
factors and commodities. The factor market equilibrium condition is 
LLL MA =+ . (10) 
 
As for commodity market equilibrium, we note that demand for agricultural 
goods derives only from household consumption. On the other hand, demand for 
manufacturing goods is the sum of household consumption and government 
expenditure. Therefore, the market equilibrium conditions for agriculture and 
manufacturing are, respectively, 
AA YLc =   (11) 
and  MM YgLc =+ . (12) 
 
This completes the description of the model. We have 12 equations (1)–(12), 
with 12 endogenous variables , , , , , , ,AY MY AL ML Ag Mg g p , , ,  and ; and 
six parameters 
m Ac Mc U
θ .γ ,τ , ,  and . As L 0 m
 
3.  Static Equilibrium 
We define static equilibrium as a set of , , , , , ,AY MY AL ML Ag Mg g , p , ,  and U , 
which satisfies the 11 equations (1),(2) and (4)–(12) for given ,
Ac Mc
m τ  and . We 
define sustainable equilibrium as the situation in which agricultural output exceeds 
the minimum total household consumption,
As
Lγ . First, we show the existence and 
uniqueness of the sustainable static equilibrium in this section. Combining equations 
(1), (2), (4), (6)–(12) and rearranging for g yields 
( )
( ) ( )( ) ( ) ⎭⎬
⎫
⎩⎨
⎧ ⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎝
⎛−−−+
−=
−
MMA
a
M
L
b
aLLsA
LLLg
θττθ
γ
α
α
11
1
. (13) 
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Second, substituting equations (1), (2), (4), and (8)–(10) into (7) and 
rearranging for g yields 
( ) ( ) ⎭⎬
⎫
⎩⎨
⎧ +−⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎝
⎛−= −− MMAbMb LLLa
bsLMmg ββ τ 111 . (14) 
Equations (13) and (14) comprise a system of two equations with two 
unknown variables,  and . If we solve equations (13) and (14) and substitute the 
resulting two variables into other equations comprising the equilibrium, we obtain the 
static equilibrium. From the solution to equations (13) and (14), we obtain the 
following proposition: 
g ML
 
Proposition 1: A unique sustainable static equilibrium exists if and only if the 
following inequality holds: 
 ( )( ){ } ( ) 111
1 11
1
111
11
1
1
1
>⋅⋅⋅⋅⋅⋅⋅−⋅
−+
− −−−−−−−−
+−
−
αβααβββαβ
β
αβ
αβ γ
ττ
ττ baabb
AAab
ab
baLmMAss
ab
. (15) 
Proof. See Appendix A. 
 
From Proposition 1, we see that increments in either parameter regarding 
productivities ( A , M and ) will extend the range of the government’s decision to be 
viable, because such improvements enable the economy to satisfy the above condition 
more easily. However, it is difficult to add further intuitive economic implications to 
the above condition. 
m
 
 
Figure 1. Uniqueness of a sustainable static equilibrium 
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The static equilibrium is graphically shown in Figure 1. The downward 
sloping curve and the upward solid curve depict equation (14) and equation (13), 
respectively. The intersection of these two solid lines represents the static equilibrium. 
If the equilibrium is sustainable, which means condition (15) is satisfied, the 
intersection always appears in the area above the dashed line; otherwise, it will be a 
point below the dashed line. (See Appendix A.) 
To know the effects of a change in parameters, we totally differentiate 
equations (13) and (14) and rearrange the terms, resulting in the following equation: 
⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛
+=⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛
⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛
dmbdMb
dAb
dg
dL
aa
aa
mM
AM
gL
gL
22
1
22
11  (16) 
 
where 
( ) ( ) ( )( ) ( ) ( ) 01121 <⎭⎬
⎫
⎩⎨
⎧ −−+−+−−= − MMaMAL aLLb
aaLLLLgsAa θττθα , (17a) 
( ) ( ) ( ){ 011 22 <−−−−= − LbLbaLsMma
ba M
b
MA
b
L
βτ } ,   (17b) 
( ) ( )( ) ( ) 011111 >⎭⎬
⎫
⎩⎨
⎧ −−−+−= −− MMaMAg Lb
aLLLLgAsa θττθα αα ,  (17c) 
( ) 012 <−−= −ββ ga g ,       (17d) 
( ) ( ) ( )( ) ( ) 01111 <⎭⎬
⎫
⎩⎨
⎧ −−−+−−= − MMaMAA Lb
aLLLLgsb θττθα ,  (17e) 
( ) ( ) 01 12 <⎭⎬
⎫
⎩⎨
⎧ +−−−= − MMbMAbM LLLa
bLsmb βτ ,    (17f) 
( ) ( ) 01 112 <⎭⎬
⎫
⎩⎨
⎧ +−−−= −− MMbMAbm LLLa
bLsMmbb βτ .   (17j) 
 
The determinant of the coefficient matrix is positive: 
02121 >−= LggL aaaaD . 
 
Solving the above matrix system, we obtain the comparative statics result as 
follows: 
01 21 >=∂
∂
gA
M ab
DA
L , 01 21 <−=∂
∂
LAabDA
g ,  (18a) 
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01 21 >−=∂
∂
Mg
M ba
DM
L , 01 21 >=∂
∂
MLbaDM
g , (18b) 
01 21 >−=∂
∂
mg
M ba
Dm
L , 01 21 >=∂
∂
mLbaDm
g . (18c) 
 
From these results, we can establish the following proposition: 
 
Proposition 2: An increase in any technology parameter ( ,A M or ) causes labour 
to move from agriculture to manufacturing. However, the effect on  will be minor 
when  is sufficiently close to 
m
LM
ML
( )
( ) ( ) ( )ba
LLM θττθ
+τθ
−++≡ 11
1 . Moreover, the effect of 
an increment in agricultural productivity ( ) differs from an increment in 
manufacturing productivity (
A
M or ) in the sense that improvement of the former 
reduces total government spending (
m
g ) while improvement of the latter increases 
total government spending. 
Proof. See equations (18a), (18b) and (18c). In addition, when  
( )
( ) ( ) ( ) MM Lba
LL ≡−++
+= θττθ
τθ
11
1 ,  and  become 0. Therefore, ga1 Ab1 A
LM
∂
∂ ,
M
LM
∂
∂  and 
 
m
LM
∂
∂  become 0. 
 
This result differs from results in Matsuyama (1992) and Ortiz (2004), which 
showed that the increase in manufacturing productivity does not affect allocation of 
labour between sectors. In their model, an increase in M causes a decrease in the 
relative price of manufacturing goods at the same rate as the increase in the marginal 
productivity of labour in manufacturing. Therefore, the value of marginal productivity 
in the manufacturing sector remains unchanged, and M does not affect the labour 
allocation between sectors. However, in our model, an increase in M  causes labour 
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movement and does not affect labour allocation in the long run.6 That is because an 
increase in M  leads to an increase in production in the manufacturing sector. This 
effect also causes the government revenue and government spending in each sector to 
increase. Thus, the value of marginal productivity of labour in both sectors increases, 
but the effect is stronger in manufacturing. 
 
4.  The Optimal Tax Rate and the Share of Government Spending 
So far, we have assumed that the tax rate (τ ) and the share of government spending 
( ) are fixed. In this section, we examine how the government decides these policy 
parameters. We assume that government chooses 
As
τ  and  at each moment of time 
so as to maximize representative household utility. Accordingly, a problem for the 
government is to maximize equation (8) under constraints (1), (2), (4) and (6)–(12), 
where the control variables are 
As
τ  and . Since we have proven the existence and the 
uniqueness of the static equilibrium in Section 3, we now solve, by using all 
constraints of this problem, for ( i
As
A,ic M= ) as a function of τ  and : As
( )AAA scc ,τ=  and ( )AMM scc ,τ= . 
 
Hence, the optimality conditions for the government are 
01 =∂
∂+∂
∂
−=∂
∂
ττγ
θ
τ
M
M
A
A
c
c
c
c
u   (19a) 
and    01 =∂
∂+∂
∂
−=∂
∂
A
M
MA
A
AA s
c
cs
c
cs
u
γ
θ .       (19b) 
 
To derive τ∂∂ ic and Ai sc ∂∂ ( MAi ,= ), we require the comparative statics 
of the constraints. To begin, substituting equation (4) into equation (6) and 
rearranging the terms, using equations (8)–(10), yield 
( ) ( ) ( ) 01 11 =−−−− −− MAaMAAbM CcgsLLaAcgsbMm θγ ααββb L . (20) 
 
Then, combining equations (1), (2), (4) and (7)–(11) yields 
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( ) ( )( ){ } 011 =−+−−− gLLLabgsLMm MMAbMb ββτ .7 (21) 
 
Further, combining (1), (8), (10) and (11) results 
( ) ( )αgsLLALc AaMA −= .  (22) 
 
Finally, combining (2), (9) and (12) yields 
( ) ( ){ } ggsmLMLc AbMM −−= β1 . (23) 
 
Up to this point, equations (20)–(23) comprise a system that has four endogenous 
variables, , ,  and  and two policy parameters, Ac Mc g ML τ and . Hence, by totally 
differentiating equations (20)–(23), we calculate 
As
τ∂∂ Ac , τ∂∂ Mc , AA sc ∂∂  and 
AM sc ∂∂ . Substituting these results into the optimality conditions (19) and 
rearranging the terms, we obtain 
( ) 01 =+−+
p
LcgLc AM
αββ     (24) 
( ) ( ){ }[ ]
( )[ ]LcLLpcLc
gLcLg
g
Lcs
AMA
MA
A ατγβα
ββτγβα
⋅Ω−Λ+
−+Ω−Λ−−= 11 . (25) 
 
where ( ) 01 >Ω−Ω−+=Λ LcLcpz AM τθθθ , ( ) ( )( ) 0
1 <−
−−−=Ω
MM
M
LLL
LbLba and 
( ) ( ) ( ){ }βgaAz = α sLpbMmgsLL AbMbAaM −=− −− 111 . Details of derivations of equations 
(24) and (25) are presented in Appendix B. Combining equations (7), (11), (12) and 
(24) and rearranging for τ , we obtain the property of optimal tax rate: 
MA
MA
pYY
pYY
+
+= βατ . (26) 
 
Rearranging equation (25) by using equations (7), (11), (24) and (26) yields the 
property of optimal share of government spending: 
MA
A
A pYY
Ys
 βα
α
+= . (27) 
 
These results lead to the following proposition: 
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 Proposition 3: If government chooses its policy at each moment of time so as to 
maximize the representative household’s utility, the tax rate and the share of 
government spending, respectively, satisfy the following two equations: 
MA
MA
pYY
pYY
+
+=  βατ  and 
MA
A
A pYY
Ys
 βα
α
+= . 
 
The interpretation of equations (26) and (27) is as follows. From equations (7) 
and (26), total government spending is MA pYYpg  βα += . Substituting this into (27) 
yields AAAA gYgsYp αα == . Further, the marginal product of government spending 
in the agricultural sector is equal to AA gYα . Combining these two relations, we see 
that, when government sets up its policy according to equations (26) and (27), the 
marginal product of government spending in the agricultural sector is equal to the 
price of manufacturing goods. Similarly, it is shown that the marginal value product 
of government spending in the manufacturing sector is equal to the price of 
manufacturing goods. Recalling that government procures the products from the 
manufacturing sector, equations (26) and (27) guarantee the productive efficiency of 
government spending. This result is an extension of Barro (1990), which showed the 
tax rate for maximizing social welfare is equal to the elasticity of production with 
respect to government spending. In fact, if we assume that production technologies of 
both sectors are the same, i.e. βα = , then the optimal tax rate becomes ) ( βα = . 
Hence, our model can replicate Barro’s result.8 However, we should note that 
equations (26) and (27) do not express the quantities of τ  and  explicitly, because 
the right-hand sides of these equations are also the function of 
As
τ  and . In brief, 
these equations imply a system of 
As
τ  and . Therefore, we must solve the system to As
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obtain optimal tax levels and share explicitly. In Section 5, we derive the explicit 
solutions of optimal policy and the dynamics of the model. 
5.  Dynamics of the Model and the Balanced Growth Path (BGP) 
So far, we have analysed the static equilibrium of the model and derived the optimal 
policy pairing. We now examine the dynamics of the model under the optimal policy. 
The optimal policy pairing is given by (26) and (27). We add these two equations to 
the model and turn policy parameters (τ  and ) into endogenous variables. For 
simplicity, we assume that the production functions are Cobb-Douglas functions: 
As
α−= 1a  and β−= 1b
MY AL ML
. The model is characterized by 14 equations, 14 endogenous 
variables , , , , , ,AY Ag Mg g , p , , , , ,m Ac cM U τ and ; and four parameters As
θ .γ ,  and . L 0m 
By using equations (7) and (26), we obtain 
( MA pYYpg  
1 βα += ).  (28) 
 
Combining equations (8), (9), (27) and (28) yields 
p
Yg AA
α=  and MM Yg β= .   (29) 
 
Substituting equation (29) into equations (1) and (2) and rearranging for and , 
using equation (10), yields 
AY MY
( ) 111 1 −−− −= αααααα pLLAY MA   (30) 
and MM mLMY
β
β
β β −−= 11
1
.   (31) 
 
Further, substituting equations (30) and (31) for equation (4) and rearranging for p  
gives us  
14 
 
( )
( )
1
1
11
1
11
1
1
1 −
−
−−
−−
⎥⎥
⎥
⎦
⎤
⎢⎢
⎢
⎣
⎡
−
−= α
α
β
β
β
α
α
α
ββ
αα m
M
Ap .  (32) 
 
Combining equations (6), (11), (12) and (28) yields 
( ) ( ) LYYp AM γθαθβ −+=− 11 .  (33) 
 
Further, by substituting equations (30), (31) and (32) into equation (33) and 
rearranging for , we obtain ML
( )
( )
( )
( ) L
m
m
LLmLM φθ
γφθα
φθ
γφθα α
α
α
+
−+=+
−+=
1
1
1
1  (34) 
 
where ( αβαββαα ββα
αφ −⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎝
⎛
−=
−− 1
1
11MA ) .We assume that hereafter the right-hand side 
of equation (34) is positive.9 By using equations (32) and (34), we can derive all the 
endogenous variables and GDP in terms of agricultural goods as a function of : m
( )
( ) α
α
θ
γθφα mmLYA +
+−=
1
1 ,    (35) 
( )
( ) m
mLMYM φθ
γφθαβ
α
β
β
β
+
−+= −−
1
111
1
,  (36) 
( )( ) ( )( )
( )( ) ( )( )α
α
γβαφβθαθθα
γβαφβαθατ
m
m
−+−++−
−++−=
11
1 , (37) 
( ) ( ) ( ){ }
( )( ) ( )( )α
α
γβαφβαθα
γθφαβα
m
msA −++−
+−−=
1
11 ,  (38) 
and ( )( ) ( )( )( )( ) LmmGDP α
α
θβ
γβαφβθαθθα
+−
−+−++−=
11
11 . (39) 
 
Finally, combining equations (3) and (31), we obtain an autonomous differential 
equation of : m
mMm   11
1
β
β
β βδ −−=& .  (40) 
 
Thus, we obtain the following lemma regarding the growth rate of . m
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Lemma 1: If the government chooses its policy at each moment of time so as to 
maximize the representative household’s utility, m  grows at a positive, constant rate. 
 
Here, we define the balanced growth path (BGP) as a situation in which all 
endogenous variables change at constant rates, which are not necessarily identical, 
and can be zero. The following proposition characterizes the BGP of the economy. 
 
Proposition 4: On the balanced growth path, , , ,  and  grow at the 
common rate n , where is 
MY g Ag Mg m
n β
β
β βδ −− 11
1
 M .  and GDP in terms of agricultural goods 
grow at the same common rate 
AY
nα . On the contrary, p declines at rate ( )nα−1 . 
Proof. From Lemma 1, the growth rate of m is constant. As  continues to grow, it 
becomes so large that we can regard 
m
αγ m as 0 in the long run. In this situation,  
becomes constant because equation (34) does not contain the time variant variables. 
From equations (37) and (38), 
ML
τ and are also constant on the BGP for the same 
reason. We denote the growth rate of  by , where  is 
As 
m n n β
β
β βδ  M −− 11
1
obtain 
 from 
equation (40). By taking the logarithm and then differentiating equations (28), (29), 
(32), (35), (36) and (39) with respect to t , we 
n
g
g
g
g
g
g
Y
Y
M
M
A
A
M
M ==== &&&& , n
GDP
PDG
Y
Y
A
A α== &&  and ( )n
p
p α−−= 1& . 
 
 
From Proposition 4 and equation (40), an increment in manufacturing 
productivity ( M ) or the degree of learning-by-doing (δ ) causes an increase in the 
long-run growth rate, nα , while an increment in A or  does not affect the growth 
rate in the long run. These results differ markedly from those of Matsuyama (1992), 
L
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who finds that an increment of agricultural productivity brings higher growth rate. 
This is because we assume that an increment of  is dependent on production per 
labour in manufacturing, not the scale of production. In our model, an improvement in 
m
A  causes labour to move to manufacturing sector, as shown in Section 3, and 
increases manufacturing production. However, since both increments arise at the same 
rate and do not change production per labour in manufacturing, the improvement in 
 has no effect on  and the growth rate in the long run. As for the effects of , our 
model does not engender the ‘scale effect’, which means that the size of the economy, 
which is given by factors such as population, affects the long-run growth rate for the 
same reason as for . 
A m
A
L
Further, we investigate the transitional dynamics of the GDP growth rate, the 
manufacturing sector’s share of total labour endowment ( LLl MM ≡ ), the tax rate 
and the share of government spending. For this purpose, we solve the differential 
equation (40) and use , to obtain where  is the initial state of . 
Substituting this equation into equations (34), (37) and (38) yields 
n ntemm 0= 0m m
( )
( )φθ
γφθα αα
+
−+=≡ M
L
L
1
1 0
nt
M
eml ,   (41) 
( )( ) ( )( )
( )( ) )( ( )nt
nt
em
em
αα
αα
γβφβθαθθα
αφβαθατ
0
0
1
1
+−++
−++−=
( )
α
γβ
−1−  (42) 
and ({ ( )})( )( ) ( )( )nt
nt
em
em
αα
αα
γβαφβαθα
γθφαβα
0
0
1
11
−++−
+−−=As
nte0
 (43) 
 
Substituting  into equation (39) and differentiating with respect to , we 
obtain the growth rate of GDP as follows: 
mm = t
( )( )
( )( ) ( )( )ntGDP emnGDPP =DGg ααγβαφβθαθθα φβθαθθαα 011
11
−+−++−
−++−≡ & . (44) 
 
Equations (41)–(44) lead to the following proposition about the transitional dynamics: 
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Proposition 5: Properties of the transitional dynamics of our model are as follows:  
(a)   While the manufacturing sector’s share of total labour endowment gradually 
increases on the transitional path, the share of government expenditure for the 
agriculture sector gradually decreases. In the long run, each reaches its own 
BGP level. 
(b)   If βα <  (or βα > ), the optimal tax rate is initially low (or high). It 
gradually increases (or decreases) and, in the long run, reaches its own BGP 
levels. 
(c)   If βα <  (or βα > ), the growth rate of GDP in terms of the agricultural 
goods is initially high (or low). It gradually decreases (or increases) and, in the 
long run, reaches its own BGP levels. 
Proof. (a) Differentiating equations (41) and (43) with respect to t  yields 
( ) 01 0 >+= φθ
γα αα nt
M
emnl&  
and ( )( )( )( )( )( ) ( )( ){ } 01
111
2
0
0
2
<−++−
+−−−=
nt
nt
A
em
emns αα
αα
γβαφβαθα
γθβαβα& . 
 
(b) Differentiating equation (42) with respect to t  yields 
 
( )( )( )( )( )
( )( ) ( )( ){ }20
0
11
111
nt
nt
em
emn
αα
αα
γβαφβθαθθα
γβαθβαατ −+−++−
−−+−−=&
. 
 
Since all terms in the equation above, except ( )βα −  in the numerator are positive, τ&  
is positive if and only if β  is larger than α . 
(c) Differentiating equation (44) with respect to  yields t
 ( )( )( )( )( )( ) ( )( ){ }20 0
22
11
11
nt
nt
GDP
em
emng αα
αα
γβαφβθαθθα
γβαβθαθθαφα
−+−++−
−−++−=& . 
 
Along the same lines with (b), we can show that  is negative if and only if GDPg& β  is 
larger than α . 
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Figure 2. Transitional dynamics under optimal policy. 
 
 
Figure 2 depicts the possible patterns of growth. Proposition 5 provides some 
interesting considerations. First, the manufacturing sector’s share in total labour 
endowment ( ) increases in any case, and the share of government expenditure for 
the agricultural sector ( ) declines in any case. The dynamics of  implies that the 
government shifts its policy emphasis from agriculture to manufacturing along the 
transitional path. Besides, the dynamics of  indicate the movement of labour from 
agriculture to manufacturing. This phenomenon suggests Petty-Clark’s law. Second, 
regarding the optimal tax rate (
Ml
As As
Ml
τ ), there are two possible patterns that depend on the 
relative size of the elasticity of the product with respect to government spending in 
each sector, α andβ .9 If βα > , which implies that the agricultural sector uses 
government spending more intensively than the manufacturing sector, the optimal tax 
rate declines in its transitional dynamics. In contrast, if βα < , the optimal tax rate 
continues to increase until it reaches its own BGP level. Third, the path of the GDP 
growth rate also depends on the relative magnitude of the technological parameter 
between sectors. In the case of βα > , the growth rate of GDP gradually increases. In 
contrast, if βα < , the economy’s growth rate gradually decreases, consistent with 
neoclassical growth theory. 
In our model, the minimum quantity of the consumption of agricultural goods 
(γ ) plays an important role in the transitional dynamics.10 If γ  is zero, and therefore 
the income elasticity of agricultural demand is one, then the economy has no 
19 
 
transitional dynamics in our model and is always on BGP because there is no time-
variant term in the equations (42)–(45). In contrast, if γ  is less than zero, and hence 
the agricultural goods are regarded as luxurious goods, we observe a result opposite to 
Proposition 5. 
 
6.  Concluding Remarks 
To examine the government’s role in industrialization, we constructed an endogenous 
growth model with sector-specific government spending and considered the optimal 
policy and dynamics of the economy. The main findings are as follows. (1) 
Increments in both agricultural productivity and manufacturing productivity cause the 
movement of labour from agriculture to manufacturing, implying industrialization. 
However, such labour movements cease to exist on a balanced growth path. (2) 
Depending on the relative elasticity of output with respect to government spending 
between the two sectors, the optimal tax rate shrinks or expands over time. In the long 
run, however, it stays at the level of balanced-growth-path. (3) As industrialization 
progresses, the optimal share of government spending on the agricultural sector 
declines. In other words, the policy weight shifts from agriculture to manufacturing. 
Our model has some limitations. First, it omits capital accumulation. This 
omission probably causes overestimation of government’s role because capital is a 
key factor in determining productive capacity. By considering capital accumulation, 
we may examine the relation between the roles of government and private capital. 
Second, we assume that the government is short sighted in that it chooses the policy at 
each moment of time so as to maximize instantaneous utility of households and does 
not consider the learning-by-doing effect in manufacturing. Third, our model treats 
government spending purely as spending on public goods. Therefore, we do not take 
20 
 
into account the congestion and inefficiencies, such as corruption, which are 
frequently associated with the public sector in many countries. Despite these 
limitations, our attempt offers greater possibilities for considering the role of 
government than earlier related studies. 
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Appendix A 
This appendix presents the proof for Proposition 1. First, we use superscript ‘I’ to 
denote the value of  and  satisfying equation (13). Consider the relation between g ML
g  and  by taking the latter on the horizontal axis. Then, the slope of equation (13) 
is calculated as 
ML
( )
( ) { } ( )( ) ( )( ) 011
1
21 >⎥⎦
⎤⎢⎣
⎡ −−+−+•
−=
−
− b
aaLLaLL
sA
LLL
gdL
dg
MM
A
a
M
M
θττθγα αα
Ⅰ
 (A1) 
 
where{ } ( )( ) ( ) ⎭⎬
⎫
⎩⎨
⎧ −−−+=• MM Lb
aLL θττθ 11 . As ,  approaches the value0→ML Ⅰg Ⅰg , 
where  
( ) ( ) 01lim
11
0
>
⎭⎬
⎫
⎩⎨
⎧
+=≡
−
→
α
α τθ
γ
A
a
L sA
Lgg
M
ⅠⅠ . (A2) 
 
Furthermore, as  approaches ,ML L { }•  becomes negative, and we cannot define  
appropriately by using equation (13). To avoid this situation, we solve the inequality 
 to obtain the upper limit of . It is 
Ⅰg
{ } 0>• ML
( )
( ) ( ) ( )ba
LLM θττθ
τθ
−++
+=
11
1 . 
 
As MM LL → ,  approaches the value Ⅰg Ⅰg , where 
+∞=≡
→
Ⅰ
Ｌ
Ⅰ
gg
MML
lim .    (A3) 
 
Further, we consider the properties of equation (14) as we considered those of 
 and use superscript ‘II’ to denote Ⅰg g  and  determined by equation (14). The 
slope of equation (14) is calculated as 
ML
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )[ ] 0111 2 <−−−−−= − LbLbaa
bLsMmg
dL
dg
M
b
MA
b
M
ββ τβ
Ⅱ
.  (A4) 
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As ,  approaches 0→ML Ⅱg Ⅱg , where 
+∞=≡ →
ⅡⅡ gg
ML 0
lim .    (A5) 
 
As ,  approaches the value LLM → Ⅱg Ⅱg , where 
( )[ ] 01lim 1 1 >−=≡ −→ ββτ AbbLL sLMmgg M ⅡⅡ . (A6) 
 
Since ⅡⅠ gg < , ⅡⅠ gg >  and  and  are monotonically decreasing and increasing 
in , respectively, there exists a unique and positive pair of solutions to equations 
(13) and (14) within the range of  between 0 and 
Ⅰg Ⅱg
ML
ML ML . 
For a sustainable equilibrium, which means all endogenous variables are 
positive, we consider the following condition: 
( ) ( ) LgsLLAY AaMA γα >−=   (A7) 
 
This condition implies that production of agricultural goods exceeds the total 
subsistence levels of all households. If the equilibrium does not satisfy this condition, 
this economy cannot display positive consumption of manufacturing goods from 
equations (6) and (11). On the gLM − plane, the condition indicates that the 
intersection of equations (13) and (14) must lie in the area above the boundary 
indicated by equation (A7). By using superscript ‘ B ’ to denote  and  being 
determined by equation (A7) with the inequality replaced by equality, the properties 
of the boundary are characterized by 
g ML
( ) 0
1
11 >−= +− aMAM
B
LLAs
La
gdL
dg
αα
γ
α , (A8) 
Ⅰg
As
Lgg
A
B
L
B
M
>⎥⎦
⎤⎢⎣
⎡=≡
−
→
α
α
αγ
1
1
0
lim , (A9) 
and  0lim >+∞=≡ →
B
LL
B
gg
M
  (A10) 
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This boundary is depicted by the dashed line in Figure 1. From the properties of the 
boundary and equation (13), these two curves must intersect only once in 
MM LL <<0 . To derive the value of  at this intersection, we subtract the value of 
g satisfying equation (A7), with the inequality replaced by equality, from the value of 
g satisfying equation (13), which yields  
ML
( ) ( ) { } ( ) ⎥⎦
⎤⎢⎣
⎡ −⎭⎬
⎫
⎩⎨
⎧ −+•−=− LLb
a
LLsA
Lgg Ma
MA
B τθθττθγααα 1Ⅰ . 
 
Then, we obtain the following relationship: 
( ) TMMB LLab
bLgg =−+≥↔≥ ττ
τ
1
Ⅰ  (A11) 
 
From equation (A11), if the intersection between equations (13) and (14) exists in the 
range greater than , the equilibrium must be in the area above the boundary 
indicated by equation (A7), and thus the condition (A7) must be satisfied. The 
condition for this situation to appear is  when  is equal to . (See 
Figure 1) Hence, we take the ratio of the values of g satisfying equations (14) and 
(A7), with inequality replaced by equality, which must be greater than 1: 
T
ML
Bggg =≥ ⅠⅡ ML TML
 ( )
( ){ } ( ) 111
1 11
1
111
11
1
1
1
>⋅⋅⋅⋅⋅⋅⋅−⋅
−+
−= −−
−−−−−−
+−
−
=
αβααβββαβ
β
αβ
αβ γ
ττ
ττ baabb
AAab
ab
LL
B baLmMAss
abg
g
T
MM
Ⅱ
 
 
Thus, we have Proposition 1. 
 
Appendix B 
This appendix presents the derivation of equations (24) and (25) in Section 3. Totally 
differentiating equations (20)–(23) and using the equilibrium conditions of the model, 
we obtain 
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where ( ) ( ) ( ){ }βα gsLpbMmgsLLaAz AbMbAaM −=−= −− 111 and ( ) ( )( ) 0
1 <−
−−−=Ω
MM
M
LLL
LbLba . 
If we let the determinant of the coefficient matrix be A ,  
( )( ) ( ) ( ){ }[ ] 011111 22222 >−−Ω+−Ω++−= LgpLzcgLzcpgLpzgpA AM αγβθτβθθβ . 
 
Then we have 
( )
( )10
00
10
0
1
−+−
−
−Ω−
−Ω−
=∂
∂
ββ
α
βττ
αβθθθ
τ
g
Lc
p
zL
g
Lcz
p
Lcg
g
czczz
A
c
M
A
A
M
M
A ,   (B1) 
( )
( )100
0
10
0
1
−+
−−
−Ω−
−Ω
=∂
∂
ββ
α
βττ
αβθθ
τ
g
Lc
p
z
g
LczL
p
Lcg
g
czcz
p
z
A
c
M
A
A
M
M
M ,   (B2) 
( )
( ) ( )1
1
0
10
1
1
1
−+−+−
−−
−Ω−
−Ω−⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛ +−
=∂
∂
βββ
αα
βτβ
αβθθθαβθ
g
Lc
p
zLgLc
s
g
Lc
z
s
Lc
p
Lc
g
s
g
cz
czz
ss
cz
As
c
M
M
A
A
A
A
A
A
M
M
AA
M
A
A  (B3) 
25 
 
and 
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First, let us derive equation (24). Substituting equations (B1) and (B2) into 
(19a) yields 
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where we use equation (6). Since the first bracket of equation (B5) is always positive, 
τ∂∂u  becomes 0 if and only if the last bracket of equation (B5) is 0: 
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Thus we obtain equation (24).  
Further, we consider equation (25). Similar to the derivation for equation (24), 
substituting equations (B3) and (B4) into equation (19b), we obtain 
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Therefore, Asu ∂∂ is 0 if and only if 12 sssA = . Calculating 12 ss  yields 
( ) ( ){ }[ ]
( )[ ]LcLLpcLc
gLcLg
g
Lcs
AMA
MA
A ατγβα
ββτγβα
⋅Ω−Λ+
−+Ω−Λ−−= 11 . 
 
where ( ) 01 >Ω−Ω−+=Λ LcLcpz AM τθθθ . Thus, we obtain equation (25). 
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Notes 
 
 
1. The comprehensive survey of the dual economy model is presented by Kanbur and McIntosh (1988) 
and Temple (2005). 
2. While Matsuyama (1992) is essentially based on the Ricard-Viner-Jones model, Wong and Yip 
(1999) incorporate capital accumulation in the manufacturing sector into Matsuyama (1992) and obtain 
a result similar to Matsuyama in a small open economy. 
3. Sato and Niho (1971) and Niho (1974) were the first attempts explicitly to incorporate Engel’s law 
into the dual economy model. 
4. Matsuyama (1992), formalizes the degree of learning-by-doing as a function of total output. 
However, if we apply the same formalization to our model, the transitional dynamics of the model 
becomes extremely complicated. 
5. Under our specialization of production technology, productive government spending is necessary to 
produce the commodity in both sectors. Thus, cannot take the value of 0 or 1. As
6. As we show in Section 5, labour productivity ( ) is always growing. Therefore, whatever the initial 
 is,  grows gradually and, in due time, approaches 
m
ML ML ML  because of equation (18c). 
7. Equation (21) is the same as equation (14). 
8. Ortiz (2004) also obtained the same result as Barro (1990) by using productive government spending 
as a flow, as in this study. On the other hand, Futagami, Shibata and Morita (1993) and Turnovsky  
(1997, 2000) showed that Barro’s result is not optimal if government spending is treated as a stock. 
9. If the initial  is positive, then  is always positive throughout the time path because m  grows 
at a positive, constant rate, which is proven later. 
ML ML
10. In the endogenous growth model with productive government spending treated as a flow, there is 
no model in which the transitional dynamics arise, as far as we know. 
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Figure 1. Uniqueness of a sustainable static equilibrium 
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Figure 2. Transitional dynamics under optimal government policy.
 
31 
 
